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Abstract
There has been a proliferation of counter-terrorism legislation around the world 
following 9/11, a turning point in the history of counter-terrorism. Ethiopia 
passed its anti-terrorism law in July 2009. This law and its application have 
been controversial since its promulgation. A debate on several issues relating to 
the law and its (mis)application was held in August 2013. Whether the law is 
needed at all was one of the contentious issues deliberated on. Proponents 
argue that the clear and present danger of terrorism in Ethiopia coupled with 
inadequacy of ordinary laws to deal with this reality necessitated the law. They 
also contend that the United Nations Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) 
requires Ethiopia to pass the law. Challengers dismiss these justifications as 
pretexts and maintain that the real reason for passing the law is to discipline 
dissent and crack down on opposition. This article scrutinizes the 
aforementioned justifications for the law and concludes that they are invalid.
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Introduction
Ethiopia passed the Anti-terrorism Proclamation 652/2009 in July 2009. The 
proclamation and its application have been contentious since its promulgation.* 1 
In August 2013, Ethiopian Television and Radio Agency had hosted a debate2
* LL.B (Addis Ababa University Law School), LL. M. (University of Michigan Law 
School), PhD student at Flinders University of South Australia.
Email: wondwossend@yahoo.com
1 Human Rights Watch expressed its concern about the law in its draft stage. See: 
Human Rights Watch (2009), An Analysis of Ethiopia’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Law, 
<http://www.hrw.org>. Amnesty International (2011), dismantling dissent intensified 
crackdown on free speech in Ethiopia, <http://www.amnesty.org>; Committee to 
Protect Journalists (2009), Anti-terrorism legislation further restricts Ethiopian press. 
<http://cpj.org>. By way of introduction the journalist who hosted the debate on ETV 
acknowledges this ongoing controversy.2see:
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sABjG94eT3Ehttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
g5JhwpAt4Uhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nr76bQEtnlA>
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among political parties3 on range of issues relating to the Ethiopian anti­
terrorism law and its application.
One of the issues raised and debated on was the raisons d'etre for 
promulgating the proclamation. Among the justifications provided in the 
preamble of the law, three were raised and discussed during the debate. 
Representatives of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF), the ruling party, argued that the existence of clear and present danger 
of terrorism in Ethiopia coupled with the inadequacy of ordinary laws to deal 
with this reality called for special anti-terrorism legislation. Representative of 
the Ethiopian Democratic Party, one of the four opposition political parties that 
participated in the debate, referred to the obligation of states to pass anti­
terrorism legislation imposed by UN Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), 
which was echoed by the representatives of EPRDF, as another justification for 
the enactment of the law. According to this view, there is a consensus at the 
United Nations level that terrorism is a global challenge as a result of which the 
Security Council instructs every state, including Ethiopia, to pass anti-terror 
laws.
Representatives of the other opposition political parties, on the other hand, 
argued that although there have been incidents of terrorist attacks, the threat of 
terrorism in Ethiopia has not been to an extent that justifies the special anti­
terror law. They claimed that the anti-terrorism proclamation is passed with a 
view to use it as a tool to dismantle political opposition and dissent.
This article investigates the validity of the arguments advanced to justify the 
promulgation of the Ethiopian anti-terrorism proclamation: domestic realities— 
threat of terrorism and lack of appropriate law to cope with the threat—and 
obligation under international instruments.4 The first section examines EPRDF’s 
claim that the existence of clear and present danger of terrorism in Ethiopia 
justifies the Proclamation. This part evaluates the evidence that EPRDF cited 
and relied on, during the debate, to show the existence of clear and present 
danger in light of Ethiopia’s reports to UN Security Council Counter Terrorism 
Committee (CTC). Sections 2 to 4 examine whether or not the Security Council 
resolution 1373 (2001) obliges States to pass laws on domestic terrorism.
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3 Five political parties participated in the debate. They are Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the ruling party, Ethiopian Democratic 
Party, Blue Party, Unity for Democracy and Justice Party, and Ethiopian Federal 
Democratic Unity Forum. Members with senior positions represent the parties.
4 Note that this article merely scrutinizes the reasons claimed during the debate as 
justifying the enactment of the law. By so doing, it does not assume that these are the 
only reasons for passing the law, nor does it explore and evaluate validity of other 
possible reasons.
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Finally, the article, without taking position on the rightness of having the 
anti-terrorism law, concludes that the evidence produced to justify the anti­
terrorism law is unconvincing.
1. Threat of Terrorism and Inadequate Law as Justification
One of the justifications for the promulgation of the anti-terrorism proclamation 
is that Ethiopia has faced a clear and present danger of terrorism and the 
substantive and procedural laws in place were not capable of addressing this 
problem.5 In showing the seriousness of the problem, EPRDF went to the extent 
of asserting that Ethiopia is much more exposed to terrorism even as compared 
to Afghanistan and the United States.6
The evidence that the representatives of EPRDF invoke to buttress their 
claim are predominantly terrorist acts which were committed before 2000. The 
footage of terrorist attacks was displayed during the debate which includes the 
bombings on Wabe Shebelle Hotel, Dire Dawa Ras Hotel, and Blue Tops, all of 
which occurred over a decade ago.
Security Council resolution 1373 which provides for a series of obligations 
on States established the CTC (Counter Terrorism Committee) to follow up 
progress in the implementation of the resolution by member states. Paragraph 
six of the resolution calls upon States to report to the CTC as to the steps they 
took to discharge their obligation in the resolution. A brief look at Ethiopia’s 
initial reports is helpful to know whether the government of Ethiopia believed, 
from the beginning, that the threat of terrorism in Ethiopia is real and serious, 
and special anti-terrorism law is needed.
5 A document that provides for the legislative background of the Proclamation indicates 
that the inadequacy of the existing laws to effectively prevent and control terrorism 
had got the utmost attention of the House. Third Round House of Peoples’ 
Representatives of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2008-2009, 
Approved Proclamations, Public Discussions and Recommendations, Volume 7, pp. 
71-72.
6 According to the Global Terrorism Index 2011, Afghanistan ranked 3rd next to Iraq 
and Pakistan, Ethiopia ranked 37th and United States ranked 41st in terms of the impact 
terrorism caused on countries. According to this source, Ethiopia is the least affected 
by terrorism next to Djibouti compared with neighbouring countries. Somalia, Sudan, 
Kenya, Uganda and Eritrea respectively ranked 6th, 11th, 18th, 30th and 35th. The 
Global Terrorism Index measures the impact of terrorism in 158 countries since 2001 
by aggregating four indicators: the number of terrorist incidents, fatalities, injuries and 
property damage. The index is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database, 
which is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism (START), headquartered at the University of Maryland. 
The Institute for Economics and Peace (2012), Global Terrorism Index. 
http://visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2012_Global_Terrorism_Index_Report.pdf
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In its first report to the CTC in January 2002, the Ethiopian government 
expressly stated Ethiopia’s vulnerability and actual exposure to terrorist attacks 
launched from al-Qaeda and the Somalia based Islamic group Al-Ittihad Al- 
Islamia.7 While acknowledging its vulnerability to terrorism, citing different 
legal instruments including the 1957 Criminal Code and the 1974 Special Penal 
Code, Ethiopia officially expressed its position that its existing laws were 
adequate for its counter terrorism in general and to prosecute perpetrators of 
terrorist attacks that had occurred hitherto in particular.8 In its 13-page 
supplementary report of 31 October 2002, the Ethiopian government reaffirmed 
its position and confidently explained how the different provisions of its 
domestic laws can be used to fight terrorism.9
As evidence of the competence of its law to deal with terrorism, Ethiopia 
cited practical anti-terrorism activities including that offenders who were 
involved in the attempted assassination of former Egyptian president Hosni 
Mubarek were successfully tried, convicted and sentenced.10 Another case cited 
in the report as example to demonstrate the adequacy of the law was the case 
involving Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia terrorists, who attempted to assassinate Dr 
Abdulmejid Hussein, former Ethiopian Minster of Transport and 
Communications.11 Addressing the concern of the CTC on the absence of a 
specific provision criminalizing terrorism, Ethiopia indicated that a provision 
that expressly criminalizes a terrorist act has been incorporated in the then draft 
Criminal Code.12
7 Letter dated 30 January 2002 from the Charge d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of 
Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter­
terrorism (hereafter the report), S/2002/137, p. 3.
<http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/241/52/PDF/N0224152.pdf?OpenElement>
8 Ibid ; Letter dated 31 October 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to 
the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, (hereafter 
supplementary report) S/2002/1234, p. 3. Available at:
<http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/690/69/PDF/N0269069.pdf?OpenElement>
9 Ibid.
10 The Report, supra note 7, p. 6
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, p. 4. This was more explicitly stated in the supplementary report, supra note 8, 
which reproduces the provision as follows:
“Article 252. Terrorist Act
1. whosoever commits a terrorist act which may endanger the life, physical integrity or 
freedom of, or causes serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of
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Though the initial position of the Ethiopian government, based on its 
consecutive country reports to the CTC, was that it can fight terrorism with the 
existing laws, it passed the special anti-terrorism proclamation in 2009. The 
reason for the shift from the position that there are adequate ordinary laws for 
countering terrorism to that of advocating for the need to have special anti­
terrorism law did not explicitly transpire during the debate. Yet, the 
representatives of EPRDF strongly argued that there is a clear and present 
danger of terrorism to justify the promulgation of the special law. To justify the 
law passed in 2009, one of the representatives cited terrorist acts committed a 
decade before the promulgation of the law. What makes this odd is that the 
reports to the CTC in which the government in clear terms state the adequacy of 
the then existing law were prepared after the commission of these terrorist acts 
which were cited as evidence of the gravity of the problem of terrorism in 
Ethiopia to call for special law.
The logical oddity of EPRDF’s usage of the pre-report terrorist attacks to 
justify the promulgation of the anti-terrorism proclamation is apparent when one 
notes how the case of attempted assassination of former Egyptian president 
Hosni Mubarek was used. As stated above, this case was cited in Ethiopia’s 
2002 report to the CTC as evidence to show how successful the government had 
been in fighting terrorism with ordinary substantive and procedural criminal 
laws. Contrary to this, the case of Hosni Mubarek was raised, during the debate, 
as evidence to justify the need for the special anti-terrorism law.
In view of Ethiopia’s 2002 threat assessment, for seriousness of the threat of 
terrorism to be cited as a good reason for the government to introduce a special 
law on terrorism, the government should have had evidence to show that the 
threat of terrorism has increased since 2002 and that the laws which were 
adequate to deal with terrorist attacks and threats up until 2002 are no longer 
sufficient to cope with the increasing threat. However, no evidence was
persons, or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural
resources, environment or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
(a) Intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or seduce any government, body, institution, 
the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to 
adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
(b) Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to 
create a public emergency; or
(c) Create general insurrection in a state;
is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from ten to twenty five years; or in grave 
cases, with rigorous imprisonment for life or death.
2. Any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid incitement,
encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any 
person, with intent to commit any of the acts referred to in Sub-article (1) of this 
Article shall be punished in accordance with Sub-Article (1) hereof (emphasis 
added)." Supplementary report, supra note 7, pp. 3- 4.
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produced to warrant this conclusion. Apart from indicating that the new law has 
made it possible for the Ethiopian security forces to foil a good number of 
terrorist plots and to investigate and prosecute terrorist acts, no point was made, 
for example, to show that this would not have been possible under the ordinary 
laws. No mention of terrorist acts which escaped investigation and prosecution 
due to the shortcomings of ordinary criminal laws was made. The terrorist acts 
in the footage shown in the middle of the debate, supposedly justifying the law, 
were committed before the 2002 report.
The incidents cited by promoters of the Anti-terrorism Proclamation during 
the debate being predominantly those which occurred prior to 2002, there seems 
no convincing evidence to show that there has been an increase in terrorism 
threat after 2002. in the absence of evidence to show the change in the level of 
threat, reference to the terrorist attacks that took place prior to 2002, which were 
not then considered as too difficult to be addressed by the then ordinary laws, to 
justify the anti-terror law passed in 2009 is not thus logical and convincing.
2. Obligation under International Legal Instruments as 
Justification
The other justification that EPRDF put forward when challenged on the need to 
have the anti-terror law is Ethiopia’s obligation imposed by the Security Council 
resolution 1373 to pass anti-terrorism legislation.13 This resolution was 
mentioned as the major international instrument requiring states to pass anti­
terror laws in the document that shows the legislative background of the 
Ethiopian Anti-terrorism Proclamation.14 The Ethiopian anti-terrorism 
proclamation has been predominantly used against Ethiopians15 who are alleged 
to have committed terror-related acts within the territory of Ethiopia--domestic 
terrorism.16 This section investigates the scope of resolution 1373 - whether it 
imposes obligation on the states to pass laws applicable to domestic terrorism.
13 See supra note 3
14 Third Round House of peoples’ Representatives, supra note 5, p. 70.
15 Right from the beginning Ethiopia has been defending the law on the ground that “the 
country has a right to defend itself against rebels.” Christian Ehret (2009), “Ethiopia 
lawmakers pass controversial new anti-terrorism law”, Jurist, July 2009. While 
recognizing the international element, Woldeselase observes that it is mainly rise of 
domestic terrorism that triggers Ethiopia’s counterterrorism activity. Woldeselase 
Woldemichael (2010), Terrorism in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa; threat, Impact 
and Response, p. 285
<http://jurist.org/paperchase/2009/07/ethiopia-lawmakers-pass-controversial.php>
16 Imobighe distinguishes domestic from international terrorism as follows:
“Domestic terrorism relates to those acts of terrorism that are carried out by persons 
or local groups within the state that are meant to redress domestic grievances. This 
is distinct from international terrorism, which relates to terrorist acts by persons or
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A good starting point is to refer to the resolution itself. The preamble of the 
resolution provides the background in light of which the resolution’s operational 
part shall be interpreted. it seems to suggest that the resolution is concerned with 
international terrorism. First the two previous Security Council resolutions17 to 
which the resolution makes reference in the first paragraph of its preamble deal 
with international terrorism. Second, the resolution, in the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs
groups that are external to the affected state and whose objective is to advance an 
extraterritorial cause.”
Thomas A. Imobighe, in WafuluOkumu and Anneli Botha (editors) (2007), 
“Challenges in categorising domestic terrorism”, Domestic terrorism in Africa: 
Defining, addressing and understanding its impact on human security, p. 16. 
Andrews Atta-Asamoah suggests making use of the approach used in the treaty on 
transnational organized crimes to differentiate domestic from transnational 
terrorism. As provided under article 3(2) of the Convention, an offence is said to 
be transnational in nature if it is committed in:
- more than one state,
- one state but has a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or 
control taking place in another state
- one state but involves an organised group that engages in activities in 
more than one state
- one state but has substantial effects in another state. 16
Thus, by applying the convention’s definition by analogy, Atta-Asamoah treats a 
terrorist act as transnational if more than one territory can be identified with the 
planning, preparation, targeting, execution and effects of that act. For him, “any act 
of terrorism that occurs within the confines of a single state boundary without the 
involvement of groups with transnational spread and does not have the effects that 
transcend national boundaries can be considered domestic terrorism.”Andrews Atta- 
Asamoah, in Wafulu Okumu and Anneli Botha (eds.) (2007), “Transnational and 
domestic terrorism in Africa Any linkages?”, Domestic Terrorism in Africa: 
Defining, addressing and understanding its impact on human security, p.20.
Critics on categorizing terrorism into domestic and transnational maintain that 
the distinction between the two is basically artificial having no analytical leverage 
and hence unacceptable. Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca and Luis de la Calle (2009), 
Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence. 
<http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.031607.094133 
@violence.2013.1.issue-1 >
Atta-Asamoah questions the tenability of the categorization of terrorism into 
domestic and international in the age of globalization. He argues “under the forces 
of globalisation — an event anywhere is an event everywhere and therefore any 
terrorist event anywhere is a concern everywhere as the effects transcend state 
boundaries. This has blurred the practicality of the divide between domestic and 
transnational terrorism making the categorisation only a theoretical construct 
without practical substance.” Atta-Asamoah (2007), p. 26 
17 Resolution 1269 (1999) and resolution 1368 ( 2001)
of its preamble, reaffirms18 the Security Council’s condemnation of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and other ‘such acts which, like any act of international 
terrorism, constitute a threat to the international peace and security. That 
resolution 1373 was passed following 9/11, which is indubitably an international 
terrorist attack, and that the resolution refers to terrorist acts which are of similar 
nature with 9/11 suggest that the Security Council passed resolution 1373 by 
having international but not domestic terrorism in mind. The discussion of the 
High-level Security Council’s meeting held on the first anniversary of 9/11 was 
confined to international terrorism,19 and this gives credence to this 
interpretation of the resolution.
Though disapprovingly, many scholars agree that the global counterterrorism 
has transnational terrorism in mind.20 As a reflection of the US’ dominant 
interests, Cilliers observes, there is a global pre-occupation with terrorist groups 
having ‘global reach.’21 Atta-Asamoah notes that possibly because the 
“counterterrorism agenda in Africa is Western driven, serves the interests of 
western actors, and seeks to enhance the safety of western lives rather than that 
of Africans”22 many counter-terrorism measures and initiatives in Africa are 
primarily concerned with transnational rather than domestic terrorism. Oshita 
states that the concept of terrorism is used with reference to organizations such 
as Al Qaeda that are suspected to target Western interests which is by default 
considered to be international terrorism.23 Oshita goes further and notes that 
because the UN Security Council resolution 1373 of 2001 represents terrorism 
as essentially international in dimension, acts within the domestic space fall 
short of being terrorist for the purpose of the resolution.24
Ben Saul, on the other hand, argues that the UN Security Council’s position 
has been changing from treating only international terrorism as a threat to 
international peace and security to embracing domestic terrorism as posing the
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18 The Security Council condemned the terrorist attack that took place on September the 
9th of 2001 in its resolution 1368(2001).
19 Security Council verbatim debate, UN SCOR 57th Sess., 4607thMtg, UN Doc 
S/PV.4607 (2002).
20 The focus on international terrorism is explained in two ways. Some argue that 
attention is given to international terrorism for this but not domestic terrorism impact 
on Western interests. Jakkie Cilliers (2003), Terrorism and Africa, Essay. 
<http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/12No4/Cilliers.pdf> .Others attribute it to lack 
of information about domestic terrorism. Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009), 
supra note 16.
21 Cilliers (2003), supra note 20, p.101.
22 Atta-Asamoah (2007), supra note 16, p. 20.
23 Oshita O. Oshita, in Wafulu Okumu and Anneli Botha (eds.) (2007), “Domestic 
terrorism in Africa Ontology of an Old War in New Trenches”, Domestic terrorism in 
Africa: Defining, addressing and understanding its impact on human security, p. 28.
24 Ibid.
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same threat.25 Though a close reading of relevant Security Council resolutions, 
as argued below, does not seem to indisputably support Saul’s position, his 
reference to “threat to international peace and security” as a criterion to identify 
which type of terrorism is/are within the mandate of the Security Council is 
helpful.
In his cogent examination of the Security Council’s application of the ‘threat 
to international peace and security’ for about 60 years, Yamashita notes that the 
concept has been central in the Council’s decision making.26 Davidsson 
emphasizes on the requirement of good faith on the part of the Security Council 
in characterizing threat27 which, as argued by O’Donnell, entails a focus on 
acting responsibly while deciding on the existence of threat on international 
peace and security.28 Many observe that it is the international nature of a threat 
that justifies the Security Council’s action against it.29As argued by Young, “[t]o 
engage the United Nations, as a political and legal matter, terrorism must have a 
significant international dimension.”30 True, as provided under Article 24 of the 
UN Charter, the Security Council’s mandate is closely intertwined with the 
maintenance of international peace and security.
It follows that whether resolution 1373 is applicable to both domestic and 
international terrorism or only to the latter depends on their impact on 
international peace and security. From his examination of the Security Council’s 
resolutions passed to deal with threats on international peace and security for 
about 60 years, Yamashita concludes that the Council does not adopt a clear and 
universally applicable definition for a threat to international peace and security.31
25 Ben Saul (2008), Reasons for Defining and Criminalizing ‘Terrorism’ in International 
Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08/121, Sydney University Law School, p. 
244. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291567>; Ben Saul, in Anamaria Salinas De 
Friasetal (2012), “Defining terrorism in International Law”, Counterterrorism 
international law and practices, p. 71.
26 Hikaru Y amashita (2007), Reading “Threats to International Peace and Security,” 
1946-2005, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 18:3, p.551.
27 Davidsson (2003), The U.N. Security Council’s Obligations of Good Faith, 15 
Florida JInt ’l L, p. 541.
28 Therese O’Donnell (2006), Naming and Shaming: The Sorry Tale of Security Council 
Resolution 1530 (2004), p. 951.
<http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/5/945.full#xref-fn-13-1>
29 Yamashita (2007), supra note 26, p.552; KarelWellens (2003), ‘The UN Security 
Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future’, 8 J Conflict & Security L 
(2003) 15, p.42; N.D White (1997), Keeping the Peace, p.47.
30 Reuven Young (2006), “Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal
Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic 
Legislation”, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 29, 
issue 1, p. 31.
31 Yamashita (2007), supra note 26, pp. 551-572.
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The Council’s understanding of the concept has been changing through time. 
During the cold war, invasion of a state and the resultant infringement of its 
sovereignty by another state and a civil war in which a foreign power is 
involved were considered as threats to international peace and security.32 After 
the cold war, the concept of threat to the peace was expanded to include three 
additional cases one of which being international terrorism.33 Rosand confirms 
that the Security Council, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, declares 
international terrorism as a threat to “international peace and security”.34 
O’Donnell, citing Hume, argues that it is terrorism’s transnational threat that 
gives importance to counterterrorism.35 Relevant General Assembly resolutions 
for about thirty years and resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights since 
the 1990s confirm that international terrorism threatens international peace and 
security.36
Moreover, a survey of Security Council resolutions (passed before and after 
resolution 1373) and press releases37 relating to terrorism show that the Security 
Council has, in several occasions, linked international terrorism but not 
domestic terrorism with international peace and security. Resolution 1373 refers 
to two previous resolutions which declare international terrorism as a threat to 
international peace and security.38 The first resolution in which the Council 
explicitly associates threat to international peace and security with international 
terrorism is resolution 1269 (1999). in the first paragraph of its preamble, the 
Council expresses its deep concern with “the increase in acts of international
32 Id, p. 553
33 Id, pp. 561-62. The other two are systematic human rights violations or massive 
humanitarian crisis and development and possession of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. Id, pp. 555, 562.
34 Eric Rosand (2003), “Security Council Resolution 1373, The Counter-terrorism 
Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism”, the American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 97, No. 2, P. 333
35 O’Donnell (2006), supra note 28, p. 953.
36 Ben Saul, Three reasons for defining and criminalizing terrorism, p. 11. 
<http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Saul_0.PDF>
37 In its several paragraphs Security Council Press release SC/7207 indicates that it is 
international terrorism which threatens international peace and security. it expressly 
indicates that the steps prescribed in Resolution 1373 are meant to combat 
international terrorism. Expert of Counter Terrorism Committee, in a briefing to 
Human Rights Committee, expressly indicates that states are required to take 
legislative and executive steps with a view to combat international terrorism. Press 
Release HR/CT/630 human rights committee briefed on work of counter­
terrorism committee
38 Other resolutions passed before resolution 1373 suggesting a similar position of the 
Council include UNSC Resolutions 731 (1992); 748(1992); 1044(1996); 1189(1998); 
1267 (1999); 1333(1999) and 1363 (2001).
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terrorism which endangers - the peace and security of all States.” The eighth 
paragraph of the resolution’s preamble reaffirms that it is the suppression of acts 
of international terrorism that it considers as an essential contribution to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The other is resolution 1368 
(2001) in which the Council affirms that 9/11 and other such terrorist acts, are 
acts of international terrorism, and that they constitute a threat to international 
peace and security.
Subsequent resolutions strengthen the position that the Security Council 
concerns itself with international terrorism. The preamble of resolution 1377 
refers to Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999), 1368(2001) and 1373(2001), 
all of which, as argued above, deal with international terrorism, and it expressly 
indicates that “acts of international terrorism constitute one of the most serious 
threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century.”39 Other 
paragraphs of the resolution identify acts of international terrorism that 
constitute a challenge to all States, as opposed to acts of domestic terrorism. 
Furthermore, the Council emphatically indicates that acts of international, not 
domestic, terrorism and involvement in their financing, planning and 
preparation as well as any other form of support are contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) imposes obligation on states to pass 
anti-terrorist laws, and it strengthens the argument that the Security Council 
requires States to deal with only international terrorism. The third paragraph of 
its operational part states that the Security Council:
Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the 
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the 
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of 
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government 
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which 
constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances 
justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent 
such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by 
penalties consistent with their grave nature. (Emphasis added)
The second limb of this paragraph in which the Security Council calls upon 
States to prevent or punish (as the case may be) the commission of terrorist acts 
envisaged in the first part of the paragraph indicates the scope of terrorist acts 
which the Security Council requires States to deal with. The first part of the
39 Other resolutions passed after resolution 1373 suggesting a similar position of the 
Council include UNSC Resolutions 1390 (2002); 1455(2003); 1526(2004) and 
1535(2004).
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paragraph in which the Security Council expresses its pre-existing position on 
terrorism, including its position under Resolution 1373, indicates that what are 
considered as unjustifiable terrorist acts under any circumstances are those acts 
which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Thus, the counterterrorism 
obligation of states, as can be inferred from this paragraph, relates to terrorist 
acts which constitute the subject of international instruments relating to 
terrorism - i.e. international terrorism.
3. Sporadic Use of the Word ‘Terrorism’ without Qualifiers 
and SC’s Involvement in Domestic Terrorism Cases
A close reading of the anti-terrorism resolutions shows that their reference to 
‘international’ terrorism is not consistent. The resolutions which sporadically 
use the term ‘terrorism’40 without the qualifying term ‘international’ evoke the 
question whether this warrants the inclusion of domestic terrorism within the 
ambit of the resolutions. In particular, resolution 1456 (2003) simply refers to 
‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist acts’. Notably, in the first paragraph of its preamble, 
the Security Council reaffirms “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations 
constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security.'’"
However, there are many reasons for this not to be construed as the Security 
Council treating domestic terrorism as a threat to international ‘peace and 
security’. The Security Council, in this resolution, is reaffirming its position but 
not taking a new stance on the matter. The Council is expressing its emphasis on 
what it has already declared in previous resolutions. As discussed above that 
position is that it is international terrorism which is a threat to peace and 
security. in other resolutions, too, the context makes it clear that the sporadic 
reference to ‘terrorism’ without the adjective ‘international’ does not mean that 
the resolutions are intended to apply to domestic terrorism.41
40 For example see: paragraphs 2, 4, and 7 of the preamble part and 1st, 5th and 6th 
paragraphs of the operational part of resolution 1269(1999); paragraphs 5-8 of 
preamble part and paragraphs 1(a-d) and 2 (a-g) of operational part of resolution 
1373.
41 For example though under the 5th paragraph of preamble part of resolution 1373 the 
Security Council reaffirms to combat ‘terrorist’ acts which threatens international 
peace and security, the term terrorist act should be read in light of the 3rd paragraph 
of the resolution’s preamble in which the Council expresses that it is international 
terrorism which impacts on international peace and security. Similarly, the reference 
to ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’ acts having impact on international peace and security in 
the 1st,5th and 6th paragraphs of the operational part of resolution 1269 (1999), should 
be understood as referring to international terrorism as the link between this kind of 
terrorism and threat on international peace and security has already been established
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To support his argument that the Security Council treats domestic terrorism 
as a threat to international peace and security, Saul cites the Security Council’s 
interest in what he considers domestic terrorist acts that took place in Russia and 
Spain.42 The Security Council expressed its concern in these acts in its two 
resolutions - resolution 1440(2002) relating to the 2002 Moscow hostage-taking 
and resolution 1530(2004) relating to the Madrid bombing in Spain.
Seemingly confirming Saul’s position, both resolutions reaffirm resolution 
1373 (2001),43 and they incorporate the following similarly phrased paragraphs. 
The Security Council, in the first paragraph of Resolution No. 1440 (2002),
Condemns in the strongest terms the heinous act of taking hostages in 
Moscow, the Russian Federation, on 23 october 2002, as well as other recent 
terrorist acts in various countries, and regards such acts, like any act of 
international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security.
Similarly, the third paragraph of the Security Council resolution 1530,
Condemns in the strongest terms the bomb attacks in Madrid, Spain, 
perpetrated by the terrorist group ETA [Euskadi Ta Askatasuna] on 11 March 
2004, in which many lives were claimed and people injured, and regards such 
act, like any act of terrorism, as a threat to peace and security;
It is noteworthy that in both cases the Security Council justifies its involvement 
in the matter indicating that peace and security is at stake. The Security Council 
regards the Moscow hostage taking as a threat to international peace and 
security like any act of international terrorism. This approach is similar to the 
one in resolution 1368 (2001) in which the Security Council regards the 9/11, 
like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and 
security. When it comes to the Madrid bombing, the Security Council has 
treated it as a threat to peace and security like any act of terrorism. In the 
resolution on the Madrid bombing, the term ‘international’ is not used to qualify 
the peace and security that is endangered and the terrorism that endangers it.
Both resolutions incorporate paragraphs which impart that both incidents 
trigger one of the obligations of states as provided under resolution 1373. In its 
4th paragraph, resolution 1440:
Urges all States, in accordance with their obligations under resolution 1373 
(2001), to cooperate with the Russian authorities in their efforts to find and 
bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of this terrorist 
attack.
in the preamble part which is to be assumed to have been in the mind of the security 
council while drafting the operational part of the resolution.
42 Saul (2008), supra note 25, p. 244.
43 First preambular paragraphs of both resolutions.
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In a similar fashion, resolution 1530 under its paragraph 3:
Urges all States, in accordance with their obligations under resolution 1373
(2001), to cooperate actively in efforts to find and bring to justice the
Perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of this terrorist attack.
By stating that the Security Council urges all States, in accordance with their 
obligation under resolution 1373 (2001), to cooperate in efforts to bring to 
justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the attacks, both resolutions 
link the obligation of states under resolution 1373 to what Saul considers as 
domestic terrorist acts.44
Although some45 may characterize it as an international terrorist act owing to 
the resulting casualties which included foreigners (three Ukrainian, one 
American, and citizens of Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the 
Netherlands),46 conventionally, the Moscow hostage taking perpetrated by the 
Chechen radical militant group was a domestic terrorist act.47
The Security Council passed resolution 1530 on the assumption that ETA 
had committed the Madrid bombing. But there is consensus that the attribution 
to ETA was wrong.48 In view of the fact that the Security Council had never
44 Two Presidential statements were also made, on behalf of the Security Council,
relating to other terrorist acts that took place in Russia. One relates to the terrorist
bomb attack that took place on 9 May 2004 in Grozny, the Russian Federation. SC 
Pres Stat (10 May 2004), S/PRST/2004/14. The other relates to the taking of 
hostages at a secondary school in the town of Beslan, the Russian Federation, on 1 
September 2004. SC Pres Stat (1 September 2004), S/PRST/2004/31. Both 
statements, in their fifth paragraphs, remind states of their obligation under resolution 
1373 to cooperate with authorities of the country where the crimes were committed 
as do resolutions 1440 and 1530. However, sources show that two Arabs were 
identified as being among the responsible for the September 2004 Beslal School 
hostage taking. McAllister, J.F.O and Paul Quinn-Judge. 2004. Defenseless Targets. 
Time Magazine, Sept 05.
<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,692846-1,00.html>
45 For example, Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009), supra note 16, p. 36; Reuven 
Young (2006), supra note 30, p.31.
46 S.L. Myers (2002), HOSTAGE drama IN MOSCOW: RUSSIA RESPONDS; PUTIN VOWS 
HUNT for terror CELLS AROUND THE WORLD, New York Time. October 29.
47 O’Donnell (2006), supra note 28, p. 953.
48 Ibid; Saul (2008), supra note 25, p. 244. Though direct link with Al-Qaeda could not 
be established during the investigation of the incident and trial of the suspects, the 
organization has declared as being responsible for the bombings in response to 
Spanish collaboration with the Bush administration in the global war against 
terrorism. BBC news (2004), Full text: 'Al-Qaeda' Madrid claim. 14 March. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3509556.stm> The Spanish judiciary initially 
stated its suspicion of involvement of “a loose group of Moroccan, Syrian, and 
Algerian Muslims.” While several foreigners are reported to be suspected for
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reacted to domestic terrorist acts prior to the Madrid bombing, O’Donnell 
attributes the Security Council’s involvement in the Madrid bombing more to 
illegitimate manoeuvring of the Spanish government and the Council’s inherent 
European bias than to the Council’s deliberate move to extend its mandate to 
domestic terrorism.49
On the other hand, O’Donnell50 notes that though the Council’s involvement 
in a terrorist act committed by ETA appears to be questionable at first glimpse, 
ETA’s connection to South America, Europe (in particular France from where it 
sometimes operates) and the Middle East, a fact acknowledged by Saul himself,51 
would give the Madrid bombing a transnational character, thereby justifying the 
Security Council’s resolution on the matter under its terms “threat on 
international peace and security”.
4. Plausible Interpretation of Resolution 1373
From the preceding discussion the following alternative interpretations can be 
made on whether resolution 1373 is applicable to domestic terrorism.
a) in spite of numerous domestic terrorist acts, the Security Council has passed 
only two resolutions relating to two terrorist acts the domestic nature of 
which is questionable. These resolutions reminded states of their obligation, 
under resolution 1373, to cooperate with the authorities of states within the 
territories of which the acts were committed in bringing the perpetrators of 
the terrorist acts to justice. The two resolutions viewed in light of the 
enormous evidence that counter-terrorism resolutions in general and 
Resolution 1373 in particular are passed having international terrorism in 
mind 52 are inadequate to show that resolution 1373 is applicable for 
domestic terrorism.
b) Even if the terrorist acts in Russia and Madrid are said to be purely domestic 
and Security Council’s reference to states’ obligation under resolution 1373 
is considered to be indicative of the resolution’s applicability to domestic 
terrorism, it would still be hasty to draw on this and conclude that resolution 
1373 is meant to apply to all aspects of domestic terrorism for the following 
reasons.
involvement in the bombings one Moroccan was convicted for being among the 
persons who were involved in the Madrid bombings. BBC news (2005), Madrid 
bombing suspects, 10 March. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3560603.stm>
49 O’Donnell (2006), supra note 28, pp. 948-53.
50 Id, pp. 952-53.
51 Saul (2008), supra note 25, p. 244, note 208.
52 It is noteworthy that except in the above two concrete cases in none of the anti­
terrorism resolutions is express reference made to domestic terrorism in the abstract.
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i. It is only one of the obligations that resolution 1373 imposes on states--the 
duty of states to cooperate actively in efforts to find and bring to justice 
the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of terrorist attack - which is 
invoked by both Security Council resolutions 1440 and 1530. Thus, the 
only plausible inference that can be made from the two resolutions is that 
regarding domestic terrorism, resolution 1373 requires states to cooperate, 
nothing more, with a state within the territory of which the domestic 
terrorist act is committed such as by supporting the state’s authorities 
efforts to find and bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and 
sponsors of the terrorist attack.
ii. Even the duty to cooperate is applicable to some but not all cases of 
domestic terrorism. Resolution 1440 suggests the test on whether a given 
domestic terrorism falls within Security Council Resolution 1373. As can 
be inferred from the resolution’s 1st paragraph, it is international terrorism 
that is normally considered as a threat to international peace and security 
and falls within the scope of resolution 1373. Exceptionally, some 
domestic terrorism cases might have the same effect on international peace 
and security as does international terrorism in which case it falls within 
resolution 1373. Saul, argues that acts of terrorism (both domestic and 
transnational) are threats to international peace and security, and 
acknowledges that not all domestic terrorist acts, but only serious acts of
domestic terrorism that would have effect on international interests, can be
53considered as a threat to international peace without which a terrorist act 
cannot be within the reach of resolution 1373.
Thus, the scant evidence on the applicability of resolution 1373 to domestic 
terrorism cases applies only to the obligation to cooperate in serious cases of 
domestic terrorism, and this has nothing to do with other obligations of states 
under resolution 1373 including the obligation to pass legislation that regulate 
domestic terrorism.
in light of the discussion above, the promulgation of Ethiopian antiterrorism 
law cannot be justified by resolution 1373. International counterterrorism 
instruments in general and resolution 1373 in particular do not seem to be 
applicable for cases of domestic terrorism. It is to be noted that many Ethiopians 
who are convicted under the anti-terrorism proclamation are living safely in 
various countries including the US, which leads global counterterrorism.53 54 Had
53 Saul (2005), Definition of Terrorism in the UN Security Council, Chinese Journal of 
International Law, vol.4, no.1, p. 159-162.
<http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/1/141.full.pdf+html>
54 In fact, the opposition, during the debate, points that it is because foreign states do not 
regard the Ethiopian terrorism prosecution and trial process as fair that in addition to 
providing safe heaven allow their institutions to grant awards to some of those who
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resolution 1373 been applicable to domestic terrorism, the Ethiopian 
government would have been able to invoke many of the provisions of the 
resolution to require foreign states, where its convicted citizens reside, to 
comply with their obligation under the resolution. For example, the government 
could have required concerned foreign states: to prohibit convicted Ethiopians 
from earning funds which are assumed to facilitate terrorist acts, and to freeze 
their funds and other financial assets or economic resources (Article 1(c & d)); 
to deny safe heaven to those who are convicted for financing, planning and 
supporting terrorist acts (Article 2 (c )); to prevent those who are convicted for 
financing, planning, facilitating or committing terrorist acts from using their 
respective territories for those purposes against other states (Article 2(d)).
Conclusion
Two factors are said to constitute the raisons d'etre for Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism 
proclamation: threats of terrorist attacks and state’s obligation to combat 
terrorism. As highlighted under Section 1, the terrorist attacks that occurred 
prior to 2002, which were not then considered ‘serious enough’ to call for 
special law have been used as evidence to justify the 2009 anti-terrorism 
proclamation. This ground can be valid only if the Ethiopian government 
concedes that it had unduly failed to appreciate the magnitude of the threat and 
that it overestimated the functional applicability of the criminal law and criminal 
procedure regimes prior to the enactment of the 2009 Anti-Terrorism 
proclamation. However, a close reading of the 2002 report makes this 
possibility unlikely because the report indicates that the government has given 
the utmost consideration55 to the implementation of resolution 1373 from the 
beginning. It is with this level of attention that Ethiopia reiterates its position in 
its supplementary report of october 2002 by citing specific provisions of the law 
that the government believes to be relevant and adequate to fight terrorism and 
implement its Security Council Resolution1373 obligations.
True, the Criminal Code does not incorporate provisions that punish every 
act/intention that the anti-terrorism proclamation criminalizes and punishes. No 
doubt that as far as terrorism is concerned the proclamation has a broader scope,
are convicted for terrorism. For rewards for Reeyot Alemu, who is convicted for 
terrorism related crime and serving sentence see:
<http://iwmf.org/honoring-courage/2012-courage-in-joumalism-awards/awardees/reeyot-
alemu.aspx>;<http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-
view/news/ethiopianj ournalist_reeyot_alemu_wins_2013_unesco_guillermo_cano_world_pr 
ess_freedom_prize/#.UljEzqyVp8E>. For awards to Eskindir Nega, another convict, 
see:<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QZB-cRycKdA>. For awards to both see: 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/20/ethiopia-4-journalists-win-free-speech-prize>
55 The Report, supra note 7, p. 3
a feature not liked by many, 56 compared to the Criminal Code. This apparently 
gives much more power to the police and security officials compared to the 
1961 Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code. However, in view of the fact that the 
government’s position was that the existing ordinary law is adequate to deal 
with the terrorist attacks that occurred prior to the report, to use the same 
terrorist attacks to show that the existing laws are inadequate and to justify the 
need for special law is at least unconvincing.
Drawing on the content of resolution 1373, other counterterrorism 
international legal instruments and related literature, it can be concluded that the 
Security Council Resolution 1373 does not require states to pass legislation on 
domestic terrorism. Ethiopia cannot thus invoke the resolution to justify its anti­
terrorism law which is being applied primarily on citizens.
However, this is far from concluding that the Ethiopian antiterrorism 
proclamation is not justified at all, nor does this article suggest that the 
opposition’s claim is valid. The core argument of this article is that, the grounds 
mentioned during the debate as justifications for the promulgation of the law are 
not valid, subject to the caveat that this should not be misconstrued as an 
unqualified negation to the aptness of having an anti-terrorism law. ___■
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56 See, for example, Amnesty International, supra note 1; 
Journalists, supra note 1.
Committee to Protect
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons
Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 4.0 License.
To view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/
Institute of 
Development Studies
